By: Cate Callahan ’28
In 2022, the Malian government and Wagner Group forces killed over five hundred civilians in one counterterrorism attack, and forty percent of the violent deaths of civilians in Mali was a direct result of counter attacks on jihadist groups by the Mailian government and Wagner groups. This resulted in a surge of jihadist recruitment. This is not the only example of counterterrorism resulting in higher attacks and recruitment. In Sahel, Jihadist attacks have doubled since 2021 as a result of the military coups and civilian targeting during counterterrorism attacks. Through this violence, instead of protecting its civilians the government has only alienated itself (1).
In coastal West Africa, Benin’s operation Mirador militarized borders, creating further distrust of the government and even more violence among civilians. Benin has similarly been responsible for civilian deaths as a result of their military, creating tension between civilians and government over the violence of these counterterrorism attacks (2). In Sahel, the Fulani have historically been excluded from volunteer militias by its government because of continued fears that they could have ties to jihadists groups. These same volunteer militias continue to perpetuate counterterrorism attacks that lead to substantial civilian death. This creates a division between these volunteer militias and its civilians, specifically within the Fulani (1).
This violence on civilians and resulting alienation from their government creates opportunity for Jihadist groups to not only recruit these civilians, but gives them more reason to fight for the Jihadist cause, resulting in extremism. Jihadist groups use their attacks as opportunities to present themselves as protectors against these seemingly corrupt and unsafe governments. This failure of the government through its alienation of its population is furthered by Jihadist groups’ ability to fulfill the government’s neglect of its people. In Sahel, the JNIM (or Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) has created local governance and support where the actual government has failed. They provide civilians public goods such as schools and healthcare, which the government continues to fail to provide. Furthermore, the ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province), unlike the government, does not discriminate against the Fulani. This further attracts members of the ethnic group who want revenge against the militias that have discriminated against them. This support comes despite the ISSP implementing strict Sharia laws and harsh punishments such as public executions (1).
This weak governance allowing for Jihadist recruitment extends to Mali. The government’s historical neglect of rural areas in favor of its urban capitals is reminiscent of the factors that originally led to the Malian Civil war, the failure for the government to provide its citizens basic services. It is hard to trust a government that allowed terrorists to gain power and that when it carries out counterterrorism efforts it represses and alienates civilians (1).
Jihadist groups are aware of this, and in places such as Benin and Togo, they focus on regions where the government is weak and relatively unresponsive to its citizens. The absence of state governance, allows Jihadist groups to engrain themselves among the local population by providing them with services and an alternative governance system. Counterterrorism attacks often fail to address the population’s needs, furthering local grievances instead.
In comparison, when these issues are addressed, counterterrorism efforts are more effective. For example, in Niger there has been a significant reduction of violence through the negotiation by the government with Jihadist groups and a continued effort to address ethnic tensions. It is not simply the presence of Jihadist groups, but the continued failure of the governments, that allow for these groups to continue to gain power (1).
Furthermore, foreign military intervention is, when only focused on short term attacks, ineffective in creating long term stability of these areas. France’s involvement in the Sahel from 2014 to 2022 did result in the deaths of some senior jihadist leaders. However, they failed to address the root issues that allowed for jihadist groups to gain power in the region originally. As a result, these groups saw renewed success when France withdrew its forces in 2022. Similarly, trend followed the departure of the United Nations’ Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023. The soldiers in that area had provided some stability and protection of the major roads and cities, but failing to address the root causes of the region’s problems, they open the way for the recovery of jihadist groups. Jihadists cut off supplies and blocked access to the historic city of Timbuktu within months of the UN departure (1). Furthermore, in Benin and Togo, the pitfall of the Accra Initiative, a regional security plan focused yet again on military attacks and patrol without creating government programs for its citizens, soon became clear. Attacks in Benin doubled as Jihadists were able to go into unprotected territory and use it as a safe haven and launching pad for attacks elsewhere (2). Foreign forces created temporary solutions to these Jihadist attacks, but failed to produce long term stability. As a result, Jihadist groups not only return once their forces leave, but come back stronger after these foreign forces prove that they do not offer long term support to these communities.
In order for counterterrorism efforts to truly be effective, both foreign and local governments must first address underlying civilian concerns, instead of repressing its citizens, in order to reduce jihadist recruitment and create long term stability.
Citations
- DeAngelo, Michael. Counterterrorism Shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/counterterrorism-shortcomings-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-niger/.
- Eizenga, Daniel, and Amandine Gnanguênon. Recalibrating Coastal West Africa’s Response to Violent Extremism. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief no. 43, 22 July 2024, https://africacenter.org/publication/asb43en-recalibrating-multitiered-stabilization-strategy-coastal-west-africa-response-violent-extremism/.
- NATO. Countering Terrorism. NATO, 25 July 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.
- Palmer, Alexander, et al. Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: What the Data Tell Us. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 21 Jan. 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/jihadist-terrorism-united-states.
- Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 Oct. 2024, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.
